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FRANKFURT COUNTEREXAMPLES:
SOME COMMENTS ON THE
WIDERKER-FISCHER DEBATE
David P. Hunt
One strategy in recent discussions of theological fatalism is to draw on
Harry Frankfurt's famous counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) to defend human freedom from divine foreknowledge. For
those who endorse this line, "Frankfurt counterexamples" are supposed to
show that PAP is false, and this conclusion is then extended to the foreknowledge case. This makes it critical to determine whether Frankfurt
counterexamples perform as advertised, an issue recently debated in this
journal via a pair of articles by David Widerker and John Martin Fischer. I
suggest that this debate can be avoided: divine foreknowledge is itself a
paradigmatic counterexample to PAP, requiring no support from suspect
Frankfurt counterexamples.

A famous argument by Harry Frankfurt, challenging a widespread
assumption about moral responsibility, rests on a special type of counterexample.} Following Peter van Inwagen, let us call instances of this
type "Frankfurt counterexamples. " l A typical Frankfurt counterexample
goes like this. Jones murders Smith, and does so under conditions
which are as favorable as possible to Jones's freedom and responsibility,
given the following peculiarity. There is a third party, Black, who wishes Jones to murder Smith, and who possesses a mechanism capable of
monitoring and controlling a person's thoughts. Thinking that Jones
might well do what he wishes him to do anyway, but unwilling to be
disappointed in this expectation, Black programs the mechanism to
monitor Jones's thoughts for evidence of his intentions with respect to
murdering Smith, and to manipulate those thoughts to ensure the murder of Smith should it appear that Jones is not going to acquire the requisite intention in any other way. As it happens, the mechanism does
not have to intervene in the course of events, because Jones goes ahead
and murders Smith on his own.
Frankfurt thought that two judgments are pretty obviously warranted
in such a case. First, Jones is morally responsible for killing Smith: the
other aspects of the situation were posited to be ideal for moral responsibility, while the mechanism did not end up contributing in any way to
Jones's decision to kill Smith (which would have occurred just as it did
even if the mechanism had not existed). Second, Jones was unable to
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refrain from killing Smith: given the mechanism, no alternative course
of action was available to Jones, though he was completely unaware of
this fact. The case therefore seemed to Frankfurt to constitute a decisive
counterexample to the "principle of alternate possibilities" (or "PAP"),
which Frankfurt formulated as follows: "a person is morally responsible
for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise."3 Similar
principles, couched in terms of free will rather than moral responsibility,
appear equally susceptible to Frankfurt counterexamples, and have for
this reason been linked to PAP in the subsequent literature.
Of the various philosophical puzzles which turn on the availability of
alternate possibilities, one that is presumably of special interest to readers of this journal is the problem of "theological fatalism." This problem
lies in the fact that a powerful argument can be formulated for the conclusion that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with libertarian freedom: What divine foreknowledge directly excludes, according to the
argument, is the existence of alternate possibilities: if alternate possibilities exist, there is some time T and some action A (consisting of a particular person tokening a particular action-type at a particular time) which
are such that, while the actual future relative to T contains A, a possible
future relative to T contains -A; but if divine foreknowledge exists, the
past relative to T (no matter how early T might be) contains an infallible
belief in A, and this entails that 110 possible future relative to T contains
-A. With alternate possibilities excluded by divine foreknowledge,
what completes the connection with libertarian freedom is clearly something like PAP-e.g., "a person is Oibertarianly) free in what he has done
only if he could have done otherwise."s
The idea that rejecting PAP might be a viable move in confronting
theological fatalism was curiously long in coming, and has only recently
secured a place in the ongoing discussion. 6 It is not surprising, then, that
debate over the implications for PAP of "Frankfurt-style" counterexamples has now reached the pages of this journal, in the form of a pair of
articles by David Widerker and John Martin Fischer. 7 Widerker offers
reasons for doubting that Frankfurt counterexamples refute PAP, while
Fischer defends the efficacy of the counterexamples. It is true that the
connection with theological fatalism is not brought out (or even mentioned) in either of these two articles; but there can be little doubt that
this is the sub text of the dispute between Widerker and Fischer. Both
have written extensively on the problem of divine foreknowledge v.
human freedom/ and both have addressed the relationship between this
problem and Frankfurt's argument against PAP." Moreover, both have
offered astute (and, to my mind, devastating) critiques of the most popular strategy for avoiding the problem, namely, "Ockhamism". This
strategy, first adumbrated by William Ockham, distinguishes "soft"
from "hard" facts about the past and numbers God's past beliefs about
future contingencies among the former. The upshot is that the future is
not "fixed" by God's past beliefs about it since those beliefs (being
"soft") are not themselves "fixed" until the foreknown events transpire:
God's foreknowledge regarding A will turn out to have been a belief
that A if A ensues and a belief that -A if A does not ensue. On this view
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divine foreknowledge is perfectly compatible with alternate possibilities,
and so gives rise to no PAP-based threat to human freedom. Since
Widerker and Fischer both reject this strategy, and accept as a consequence of rejecting it that alternate possibilities are indeed excluded by
divine foreknowledge, the only alternative (short of rejecting divine
foreknowledge, on the one hand, or human freedom, on the other) is a
re-examination of PAP. Because they have ruled out other exits from the
dilemma, and because Frankfurt counterexamples seem to pose the
strongest challenge to PAP, it is natural for Widerker and Fischer to
regard a verdict on these counterexamples as integral to the assessment
of Pike's argument for theological fatalism. It is this implicit agreement
between Widerker and Fischer, rather than their explicit disagreement
over the verdict, that I wish to examine in the brief remarks that follow.
Suppose a mechanism M is such that, were M active, it would render
A unavoidable. Consider two mechanisms of this sort: MI is a mechanism which, when active, produces coercive conditions sufficient for A to
occur, while M2 is a mechanism which, when active, produces an infallible belief that A will occur. Consider further two scenarios in which such
mechanisms would bring about A's unavoidability. The first is where
the mechanism is active. Call this an "actual intervention scenario." The
second is where the following are true:
(a) A will occur.
(b) If (and only if) it is the case that, were the mechanism inactive, A would not occur, then the mechanism is active.
(c) It is not the case that, were the mechanism inactive, A
would not occur.
Call this a "counterfactual intervention scenario." The two scenarios
together with the two mechanisms yield four possible combinations, in
all of which A is unavoidable. Now a Frankfurt counterexample always
involves an Ml mechanism placed in a counterfactual intervention scenario
(call this combination a "counterfactual M, scenario"). Among the possible mechanisms mentioned by Frankfurt are a threat so terrible that it is
psychologically irresistible; an inner compulsion generated by a potion
or hypnotic state; and a direct manipulation of the brain and nervous
system. lO But in Frankfurt counterexamples no intervention in fact takes
place; unavoidability rests instead on the fact that, were certain conditions to obtain (and they don't), an intervention would occur (though it
doesn't). Divine foreknowledge, on the other hand, involves an M2
mechanism operating in an actual intervention scenario (call this combination an "actual M2 scenario"). Here unavoidability rests on the actual
operation of a cognitive mechanism that does not cause, compel, or in
any way bring about what it cognizes." The great difference between
the two cases-a counterfactual MI scenario v. an actual M2 scenarioraises a prima facie question whether the judgment we make about
Frankfurt counterexamples is really transferrable to divine foreknowledge, as Widerker and Fischer implicitly assume.
(1) Suppose first of all that PAP survives the Frankfurt counterexamples, as Widerker alleges. How much does its success in this case
enhance its prospects for success in the foreknowledge case? Not much,
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since the difficulties Widerker raises for Frankfurt counterexamples (and
which Fischer tries to circumvent) appear to arise precisely from those
features of the counterexamples in virtue of which they instance a counterfactual M scenario.
The following difficulty is typical. How is it that the counterfactual
intervener can step in when (and only when) Jones would otherwise
desist from murder? There must be some feature of the actual situation
(in which no intervention takes place) which guarantees that Jones will
murder Smith; there must also be some feature of the counterfactual situation (in which intervention does occur) which guarantees that Jones,
without this intervention, will not murder Smith. But then it appears
that a counterfactual M scenario can make the murder of Smith
unavoidable for Jones only if the murder is causally determined (for
how could the guarantee be completely reliable without causally necessitating what it guarantees?). If this is so, then the libertarian will deny
that this is after all a case in which Jones is morally responsible for his
unavoidable deed, and the example will fail to provide a decisive refutation of PAP. This problem can be evaded by shifting to an actual intervention scenario, where intervention does not wait upon a causal guarantee. But this only exchanges one problem for another, since an M
mechanism that is actually intervening (rather than waiting on the sidelines) makes the murder unavoidable by causally necessitating it, again
jeopardizing Jones's moral responsibility. Either way, Frankfurt's attack
on PAP falls short.
It is not necessary to decide the cogency of this line here. What is
important is that this defense of PAP is possible only because Frankfurt
counterexamples involve an M, mechanism operating in a counterfactual
intervention scenario. A counterexample to PAP must (i) preclude alternate possibilities while (ii) preserving moral responsibility. Actual interventions by an M mechanism are coercive and consequently fail
requirement (ii), while merely counterfactual interventions, though not
themselves (actually) coercive, satisfy requirement (i) only if the conditions triggering or forestalling intervention are embedded in a deterministic environment inimical to (ii). Because it is precisely the counterfactual M character of the Frankfurt counterexamples that Widerker
exploits in turning aside their attack on PAP, there is no reason to think
that the same defense can be offered against divine foreknowledge
cases, which are neither M nor counterfactual.
(2) Suppose instead that PAP fails in face of the Frankfurt counterexamples, as Fischer (following Frankfurt) argues. How much does its
failure in this case increase its likelihood of failure in the other case? It
might be thought that the question is irrelevant: if PAP is refuted by
Frankfurt counterexamples, it can't be appealed to in an argument for
theological fatalism, and that's the end of that. True; but this is just a
temporary solution which will work only long enough for the theological fatalist to shift to a restricted version of PAP which no longer purports to cover counterfactual M, scenarios. So we are brought back to
the question, How much does PAP's failure in a counterfactual M, scenario increase its likelihood of failure in an actual M2 scenario?
j

j

j

j

j

j
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Again, not much, and this for two reasons. First, PAP is strongly
intuitive; as Frankfurt himself noted, "[ilt has generally seemed so overwhelmingly plausible that some philosophers have even characterized it
as an a priori truth."'2 The idea that the future is (at least on occasion)
"open," a field for alternate possibilities, is not only entrenched in our
moral thinking, but also in our thinking about time: without it, an
important asymmetry between past and future would be lost. So even if
PAP can be shown to fail in Frankfurt cases, there may be considerable
intuitive pressure to isolate its failure to just those cases in which it can
be shown to fail while continuing to assume its validity in other cases (at
least absent some independent reason for thinking that it fails in these
cases as well).
Second, the failure of PAP in the face of Frankfurt counterexamples
does nothing to enhance its prospects for failure in divine foreknowledge cases because the latter do not need support from the former-and
could not acquire it from that source in any case. This is because PAP's
failure is considerably more obvious in the case of divine foreknowledge
than it is in a counterfactual M, scenario. Recall what it is about
Frankfurt's counterexample that is supposed to leave Jones morally
responsible for Smith's murder despite its inevitability. Frankfurt himself characterized its exculpatory features this way: the mechanism
"played no role at all in leading [Jones] to act as he did;" indeed, "everything happened just as it would have happened without Black's presence in the situation and without his readiness to intrude into it;" for
this reason the counterfactual intervener is "irrelevant to the problem of
accounting for a person's action" and "does not help in any way to
understand either what made [Jones) act as he did or what, in other circumstances, he might have done."D But if this is true of the Frankfurt
counterexamples, it is all the more true of divine foreknowledge cases.
God's infallible beliefs about the future rule out alternate possibilities
without their making any difference to, or playing any role in, or helping in any way to explain the future. If these grounds for rejecting PAP
are cogent in the case of Frankfurt counterexamples, they should be
equally cogent in the case of divine foreknowledge. Indeed, they should
be more cogent, since foreknowledge cases are immune to the difficulties
Widerker raises for Frankfurt counterexamples.
In sum, the strategy one finds employed when Frankfurt's argument
is brought to bear on the problem of theological fatalism is the following. First, we are supposed to see that PAP is false by considering one of
the Frankfurt counterexamples; second, we are supposed to reject theological fatalism because we have seen that PAP is false. Both of these
moves are vulnerable. First, the way in which Frankfurt counterexamples falsify PAP (if indeed they succeed in doing this at all) is considerably less straightforward than one would have supposed from
Frankfurt's original article. (I think that Widerker has shown this much,
even if Fischer's reply on behalf of Frankfurt is successful.) Second, the
rejection of PAP on the basis of a Frankfurt counterexample is insufficient to rebut theological fatalism, since (as we have seen) an actual M2
scenario is very different from a counterfactual M, scenario. There is a
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serious question, then, whether this strategy can really be prosecuted
successfully.
A better strategy is to draw one's counterexample from divine foreknowledge itself. God knew 100 years ago that I would write this paper.
It was therefore inevitable that I write it. But God's foreknowledge did
not cause or compel me to write the paper; I did not write it because God
foreknew that I would write it. To whatever extent it is clear in the
Frankfurt counterexamples that an action can be unavoidable without
this jeopardizing its libertarian freedom, it is at least as clear (if not more
so) in divine foreknowledge cases that the foreknown action can be
unavoidable yet libertarianly free. The same intuitions that support
Frankfurt's argument, when brought to bear on divine foreknowledge of
human actions, provide direct support for the claim that these actions
can be libertarianly free despite their inevitability. There is no need to
seek indirect support for this judgment via a consideration of Frankfurt
counterexamples-indeed, doing so can only muddy the waters by making freedom in the face of divine foreknowledge appear on a par with,
and to require support from, freedom in the face of counterfactual intervention. 14 If one agrees (as I do) with Widerker and Fischer that divine
foreknowledge does indeed entail inevitability, then divine foreknowledge constitutes a pure counterexample to PAP which does not rely on
complicated mechanisms or triggering conditions and suffers none of
the defects that Widerker attributes to Frankfurt counterexamples.
This seems to me to be the direction one ought to go in solving the
problem of theological fatalism, and it is a solution that does not depend
on the resolution of the debate between Widerker and Fischer. This
debate is certainly important inasmuch as it deepens our understanding
of the ways in which human freedom and responsibility do or do not
require avoid-ability. But the outcome of this debate is not crucial to the
question whether human freedom survives the unavoidability entailed
by divine foreknowledge. 15
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